Abstract
I. Introduction
In a pioneering paper, Brander and Spencer [1985] proved that a country can use an export subsidy to raise its national welfare. The result stems from the strategic effect of the policy on variables decided by domestic and foreign firms in the final goods market. In practice, the results of Brander and Spencer [1985] seem to justify a country's prevailing policies, such as tax offset and refund for exportation, and financing with low interest. How ever, subsequent research has shown that their conclusion must be subject to various assumptions on the conduct of firms, industry structure, re source constraint and so on. For instance, Eaton and Grossman [1986] proved that if price competition is adopted by firms, export tax, instead of subsidy, improves the national welfare.1
In another innovative paper, Brander and Spencer [1984] proved that when facing a foreign monopolist, an importing country can use tariffs to generate the terms of trade effect and extract the foreign monopolist's prof it. In any case, the imposition of tariffs on imports will reduce the consumer surplus. However, if the import demand curve is not too convex, the tariff revenues can outweigh the loss of consumer surplus and the national wel fare can thereby be improved. Further research has shown that if the dis criminatory tariffs can be applied to foreign firms with differences in pro duction costs, the importing country can enjoy even higher social welfare.2 While the two theoretical themes do not seem to be related, the study on trade in newly industrializing countries [NIC] needs to use them simultane ously. Trade of NIC has unique features.
First of all, the NIC rely heavily on a supply of key input from developed countries to produce their exports. For instance, trade statistics show that intermediate inputs and machinery amounted to more than 85% of Taiwan's imports from Japan. Further examples of the international dependence on key inputs are plentiful for production in high-technology industries in Tai wan.3 Specifically, more than 70% of Taiwan's imports of color high resolu tion cathode-ray television picture tubes [CRT tubes] and liquid crystal devices [LCD] came from Japan in the past five years.4
1. See Horstman and Markusen [1986] for free entry, Miyagiwa [1992] for international shareholdings and Dixit and Grossman [1986] for resource constraints. 2. See Hwang and Mai [1991] . 3. See Monthly Statistics of Imports: The Republic of China Taiwan District [1996] . 4. The percentages were even higher for 1993 and 1994. See the data from footnote 3.
Secondly, while supplying key inputs to N IC firms, many firms from advanced countries also produce high-quality goods in the market to com pete with exports from the NIC. For example, vertical integration, known as "vertical keiretsu" in Japan, is prevalent in many industries. The Toshiba Corp., Sharp Corp. and NEC Corp. belong respectively, to the business groups of Mitsui, Sanwa and Sumitomo.5 All of them are main suppliers for Taiwan's imports that include many components for electrical equipment such as the TFT-LCD. However, they also produce delicate goods like note book computers that use the LCD as one of the main parts, to compete with Taiwan's exports.
Thirdly, compared with those from advanced countries, N IC's exports are often inferior in quality, or at least perceived to be inferior by consumers in the world market. The inferiority of the low-quality goods may be due to poor design, poor product warranty, lack of brand-name recognition, or by consumer's judging the quality based on the country of origin. We can find evidence in the paper by Feenstra, Yang and Hamilton [1993] . They report ed that Japan has a greater variety and products mix than Taiwan in indus trial machinery and electrical equipment. They further hypothesized that the product differentiation has come from the high degree of vertical inte gration in Japan.
W ith the vertical linkage and quality differentiation between goods, the tariff on the input imports still has the terms of trade effect. The importing country still can use the tariff to fight the foreign monopoly power in the input market. However, if we consider the strategic effect of the aforemen tioned tariff, the tariff is inimical to the final goods firm of the input-import ing country. Therefore, the strategic and terms of trade effects together must be taken into account in deciding the optimal trade policy. We will adopt this perspective in our paper.
In addition, in this paper we will explore the extent to which the degree of product differentiation between goods and the "vertical keiretsu" in the advanced country affect the optimal policy. Intuitively, if final goods are extremely quality-differentiated, the market will become separate. If this is the case, when facing a foreign monopolist in the input market, the input-5. See Gerlach [1992] .
importing country need not consider the strategic effect in the final goods market but rather the terms of trade effect alone in the input market. On the other hand, if foreign firms are vertically integrated, they will look for a maximization of the profit for the business group as a whole. They can use the input price as a strategic instrument to affect variables decided in the final goods market. Therefore, in deciding the optimal trade policy, we need to examine how the input price responds to the trade policy. In particular, we will investigate the condition under which foreign firms charge a rela tively high input price and in doing so, foreclose the market.
In the literature, Chang and Kim [1989] employed an export-rivalry model to show that the less developed country should either tax its key input imports or its final goods exports. In a subsequent paper, Chang and Chen [1994] demonstrated how a change in a country's comparative advan tage in terms of production costs affect the less developed country's trade policy and trade pattern. In a different framework, Spencer and Jones [1991] showed that the foreign government's policy may call for taxing or subsidizing on both its final goods and key input exports under Cournot competition; however, under Bertrand competition its optimal policy may tax the export of one goods but subsidize the other. Moreover, Spencer and Jones [1992] showed that the home country's im port tariff on the final goods may cause the foreign integrated firms to lower the input price under the circumstances where the simple monopoly in the input market would have raised it. Recently, Lin and Hwang [1995] allowed the imported input to be used in variable proportion to produce the output. They proved that if the demand for the imported input is not too convex, the home country should impose a tariff on it. They also proved that whether the home coun try should tax or subsidize the final output depends not only on the curva ture of the import demand but also on whether the input is inferior or not.
Furthermore, allowing domestic production of intermediate inputs and using a general model different from ours, Ishikawa and Spencer [1996] showed that the incentive for export subsidy may be weakened in the pres ence of foreign firms in the input market.
In this paper, we investigate how the interplay between the degree of product differentiation and the foreign firm's structure in terms of whether there is vertical integration or not affects a country's optimal trade policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II builds up a basic model. Section III examines the optimal import-export policy when foreign firms are not vertically integrated. Section IV investigates the opti mal import-export policy in the case where foreign firms are vertically inte grated. Section V gives conclusions and offers ideas for discussion.
II. The Basic Model
Consider a model of export rivalry as illustrated in figure 1. In country a, firm A produces a key input and firm B uses the key input to produce its high-quality exports (H goods) to the third country. In our model, we will examine two cases where firm A and firm B are and are not vertically inte grated. In country j8, firm C imports the key input from firm A and produces low-quality exports (L goods) to the third country. There is no domestic consumption in country a and f5. Notice that a consumer will buy goods only when the utility is nonnegative.
Let tH (tj) be the type of consumers who are indifferent toward buying and not buying the H (L) goods, and tM be the type who are indifferent toward the two goods. These type values can be derived from (la) and (lb): tH = PH A , ti = PL, and tM = (JPH -P j)/(k -1). In the case where both goods are demanded in the market, it requires tL< tM< T. Those consumers having t > tM will buy the H goods and those between tL and tM will buy the L goods.
The inverse demand functions of the H and L goods are:
Now consider the supply side of the model. We assume that one unit of the H and L goods production needs one unit of the key input. Specifically, let CH = WH + r b e the unit production cost of the H goods where WH denotes the wage rate in country a and r stands for the input price. In the case
where firm A and B are vertically integrated, CH is equal to WH + m in which m is the unit production cost of the key input. The unit production cost of the L goods is CL = WL -\ -r + + rL where WL is the wage rate in country p and denotes the import tariff (export tax) on the key input (L goods).
Due to the production technology specified in our model, CL is affected by the sum of and t l . We will use the combined rate z = zL for the policy variable of co un try (3.
III. Optimal Import-Export Policy without Vertical Integration
In this section we examine country (5， s optimal import-export policy when foreign firms in country a are not vertically integrated. We study how the interaction between the rent-extraction incentive in the input market and the profit-shifting incentive in the goods market affects the decisions of country /5 on import-export policy. We also explore the extent to which the degree of product differentiation affects country (3， s trade policy.
A. Goods Market
According to the demand and production technology specified in the pre vious section, the profit function of firm B and C are respectively,
The first-order conditions of profit m axim ization for both firm s are respectively,
Terms in the first parenthesis of (4) and (5) denote the marginal revenues of firm B and C respectively. The remaining terms represent the tariff-inclu sive marginal production cost. One can verify that the second-order and sta bility conditions hold as well.
Solving (4) and (5) gives the Cournot equilibrium in the goods market:
It follows that an increase in the import-export tariff, r, will increase the quantity of high-quality goods and the profit of firm B. However, it will reduce the quantity of low-quality goods and the profit of firm C.
B. Input Market
Because one unit of goods production requires one unit of the key input,
and (7) can also be viewed as the derived demands for the key input.
Since firm A and B are not vertically integrated, the total derived demand in the input market is the sum of (6) and (7). L etX denote the total demand for the key input: We have
By (8), one can verify that the intercept of the derived demand curve of the input increases with the degree of product differentiation between goods. In view of the inverse demand function of the high-quality goods, we find that this is because an increase in the product differentiation will expand the market size for the high-quality goods and indirectly raise the market share of the low-quality goods. By looking at (8) Assume that the second-order condition holds. Further manipulation on the first-order condition gives the equilibrium input price:
Notice that an increase in the import-export tariff will decrease the input price, i.e.，dr/dx = ᅳ (2k -l)/4 k < 0. This is because an increase in the import-export tariff will reduce the total derived demand as (8) shows.
Moreover, in our model, we do not allow firm A to price-discriminate firm B
and C in the market. If this were so, the input price charged would be high er to the lower cost firm than to the higher cost firm.6
C. Optimal Trade Policy
Let us define the social welfare of country /3 as the sum of the C firm prof it and tariff revenue. Let G(r) denote the social welfare. Then we have
Totally differentiating the social welfare function with respect to the
import-export tariff gives dG/dz= ( d j f / d Z^Z^ (dnc/dZH)ZHr+ &nc/a r)rTH d n c/dz) +ZL+ tZL t ，
where d if/d s denotes the partial derivative of firm C's profit with respect to s，{s = L ， H and r); Z； T denotes the total derivative of the quantity of goods j (j = L and H ) with respect to the import-export tariff t . Applying (3) and (5) to the total differentiation of the social welfare with respect to the tariff yields
dG /dr = [~ZL {dZH/dr) (dr/dz) + (-ZJ (9ZH/dT) ] + [~ZL(dr/dz) ] + r [ {dZL/dr) {dr/dx) + d Z J 9 t] (10)
Terms in the first bracket of (10) denote the well-known strategic effect of the trade policy. It consists of two parts. The first one is realized through its effect of the tariff on the input price which in turns affects in a negative way the quantity of high-quality goods. Since an increase in the tariff lowers the input price, this part is negative in sign. Furthermore, the second part is 6. See Degraba [1990] for a further derivation of this. However, even in the case of price discrimination, our results will not qualitatively change.
realized through the direct effect of the tariff on the quantity of the highquality goods. It is also negative in sign. Consequently, the strategic effect is negative. This result gives the incentive to country P to subsidize its lowquality exports. The term in the second bracket denotes the terms of trade effect in the input market. Due to the negative relationship between the tar iff level and input price, the terms of trade effect is positive. This result gives the incentive to country /3 to tax its input imports. The remaining terms denote part of the effect of the tariff on the tariff revenue. Its sign is indeterminate.
Therefore, (10) tells us that whether country p ， s government should tax its imports/exports depends on how the two counter forces interact with each other. Furthermore, since the terms of trade effect and part of the strategic effect are involved with how the input price is affected by the tariff, we collect terms in (10) and obtain
dG /dx二 -ZL{dZH/dr+ 1) (dr/dr) + (-Z J (dZH/dz) + z[(dZL/d r) (dr/dz) + dZL/dz]
We see that if the high-quality goods had a derived demand curve with a slope less than -1， then the negative strategic effect would dominate the positive terms of trade effect. As a result, a subsidy may improve country /3， s welfare. However, it can be shown that the slope of the derived demand of the high-quality goods is greater than -1. Therefore, we have to compare the relative magnitudes of both strategic and terms of trade effects to decide the sign of the trade policy.
Furthermore, let us assume that the social welfare function is strictly con cave in the import-export tariff t. Using (6)， (7) and (9) to arrange (10) gives
Equating (11) with zero dictates the optimal trade policy level:
Define g(k) = 4k2 -6k 1 and h(k) 三 一 4k2 -4^ + 1. Since h(k) is negative for 쇼 > 1 and ZL is positive in our model, the sign ofg(k) alone will determine the sign of the optimal policy. 
IV. Optimal Import-Export Policy with Vertical Integration
In this section we explore the optimal import-export tax policy for coun try P when foreign firms in country a are vertically integrated. Since for eign firms are vertically integrated, they can use the input price to affect the equilibrium outcome in the final goods market. Particularly, how the input price responds to the policy variable t becomes very important in this sec tion. It is possible that the foreign firms choose an extremely high input price to force firm C to exit the market. Therefore, we will examine the con dition in which market foreclosure will not occur. We also investigate how the strategic effect and terms of trade effect are affected by vertical integra tion of firms in country a.
A. Goods Market
The profit functions of firm A y B and C are respectively, 7. In view of (6)， we need to assume a set of parameters to assure a positive equilibrium quantity of the low-quality goods.
tt4^ =[(PH-m -W H)ZH] + [ (r-m )Z J
Terms in the first bracket of (20 denote the foreign firms profit in the final goods market. The remaining terms denote the profit from sales of key inputs. As in the previous section, we assume that the input price is deter mined before the goods market equilibrium is reached. Therefore, the firstorder conditions for both C and A-\-B firms are respectively, Since the second-order and the stability conditions hold, we solve (40 and (5r) to obtain the Cournot equilibrium in the goods market:
Notice that under the specification of our m odel, the effect of a 1% increase in the tariff on equilibrium quantity of both goods will be canceled out by a 1% decrease in the input price. This feature is different from that in the absence of vertical integration in country a. It has a significant implica tion for the decision of the trade policy discussed below.
In addition, since the vertically integrated firms will maximize the profit of the whole business group, we argue that the input price will be charged at a marginal cost within the group. However, by (6') and (70， one can see that if the foreign firms can credibly announce a lower input price which is less than the marginal cost, foreign firms will have a higher market share and profit in the final goods market. But in our model we can not support this credibility.8
B. Input Market
Since firm A and B are vertically integrated, only (60 can be viewed as the derived demand for the key input in the input market. Profits from the 8. We thank a referee for raising this issue with us. Indeed, if the foreign firms can make a credible announcement on its input price as in the case of the government's subsidy on the input production, then the input price within the business group may be lower than the marginal cost. (9') is the foreign firms' marginal profit with respect to the input price and is evaluated at the market foreclosure level. We assume that the profit function of foreign vertically integrated firms is strictly concave in its input price.
dKA+ B/dZ H = (kT-2kZH -ZL) -(m + WH) = 0 dnc/dZL = (T -Z h -2Zl ) -{ t +Wl + t
Then, if the sign of (9') is negative, the equilibrium input price will be lower than the market foreclosure level. Otherwise, market foreclosure will occur.
Therefore, we have the following proposition regarding the market foreclo sure condition when goods are quality-differentiated.
P roposition 2 : When goods are quality-differentiated， i f and only if the tariffinclusive cost of country p plus the input production cost, (WL + r + m ), is less
than the quality-adjusted production cost of high-quality goods, (WH + m )/k, market foreclosure will not occur.
Proposition 2 tells us that the trade pattern is decided by the tariff-inclu sive and quality-adjusted comparative advantages of trading countries. Intu vertically integrated firms are itively, when foreign firms supply the key input to the C firm, they will encourage it to enter the final goods market. Hence, the foreign firms will have a lower profit in the final goods market. But this loss will be compen sated enough by the sales of the key input to firm C. In the equilibrium, a tariff-inclusive and quality-adjusted co m p arativ e advantage of country p must be required. It turns out that it is also a sufficient condition to guaran tee this profitable transaction. The result in Proposition 2 can be easily applied to the case where goods are homogeneous [k = 1]. Now, let us assume that k(WL + T + m ) < (WH + m). So, from Proposition 2 the key input market will not be foreclosed. However, this assumption also sets an upper limit on the tariff level. Other things being equal, if the tariff level is higher than the upper limit, market foreclosure will occur. Next, equating (80 with zero gives an interior solution to the input price:
Notice that the effect of an increase in the import-export tax on the input price is dr/dz = -2(2k 一 1 )/(8k -3). In the absence of vertical integration, we have dr/dz = -(2k -l) / 4 쇼 . One can verify that the latter is greater than the former. Both of them are greater than negative one. It tells us that the response of input price to a change in the import-export tax is stronger in the presence of vertical integration.
C. Optimal Trade Policy
As we assumed in the previous section, the social welfare of country (3 is the sum of the C firm profit and tariff revenue. 
G ( T ) = 7TC(T) + TZL
As we did in the previous section, we assume that the social welfare func tion is strictly concave in the tariff. Now, equating (12) with zero implicitly decides the optimal tariff level, r = [ (4^ -3)ZL]/2k. It follows that when for eign firms are vertically integrated, regardless of the degree of product dif ferentiation between goods, the terms of trade effect will dominate the strategic effect. We conclude that the optimal policy for country (3 is to tax its imported inputs and/or low-quality exports.
Moreover, we argue that the optimal tariff will not result in a relatively high input price and foreclose the market. To see this, let t be equal to {WH + m )/k -(WL + m). Then, under this condition, (90 tells us that foreign ver tically integrated firms will foreclose the market and ZL will be zero. Howev er, evaluated by t = z] (12) is negative in sign. Since the social welfare func tion is strictly concave in the tariff, we conclude that the optimal importexport tariff level will be lower than t. We summarize the results in this sec tion by the following proposition:
P ro p o sitio n 3 : When foreign firms are vertically integrated， regardless of product differentiation between goods, country p should tax either its key input imports or its low-quality goods exports. The optimal tariff level will not result in a market foreclosure.
V. Conclusions
Trade literature has shown that if imports are supplied by a foreign monopolist and the demand is not too convex as to the origin, a tariff can improve the national welfare. Meanwhile, if firms are engaged in Cournot competition in the goods market, a subsidy is needed to raise the national welfare. In the case without vertical integration of foreign firms, we have
shown that if and only if the degree of quality-differentiation between goods is less than 1.3, the input dependent country should subsidize its final goods exports and/or key input imports. However, when foreign firms are vertical ly integrated, either a tariff on the imported input or a tax on the export of low-quality goods is the dominant strategy for the input dependent country.
There are many ways that the model in our paper can be extended. One possible extension of the research is to consider the catch-up in technology of the input dependent country and to examine the implication of this for trade policy.
